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Problem area 
The growing amount of air transport 
creates the need for more weather 
independent airport operations. 
Currently, Low Visibility 
Conditions have a negative effect 
on airport capacity. One of the 
reasons is the limited outside view 
of Ground Controllers from the 
control tower, which generates 
additional workload, and limits the 
number of taxiing aircraft a 
controller can control. 
The current study considers the 
transfer of some of the Ground 
Controller tasks to the flight crew as 
a potential means to increase 
capacity. With use of additional 
systems in the cockpit, flight crews 
may be able to perform these tasks 
and become more independent of 
air traffic control while taxiing at 
the airport. In the ultimate case, the 
flight crew can operate 
autonomously on the airport 
surface, hence: autonomous taxiing. 
 
Description of work 
A flight simulator experiment has 
been conducted in the NLR 
GRACE full-flight research 
simulator. This experiment was 
used to study the potential of 
autonomous taxiing, with focus on 
taxi separation. Three different 
combinations of autonomy level 
and taxi display support have been 
evaluated against two low visibility 
conditions. The autonomy 
conditions consisted of either ATC 
or the flight crew being responsible 
for conflict detection and resolution. 
In the case where the flight crew 
was responsible there was no ATC 
present at all. The taxi display 
support included visualisation of the 
route and levels of cockpit display 
of traffic information and conflict 
alerting information. 
Five flight crews existing of 
professional airline pilots 
participated in the experiment and 
conducted 12 taxi runs containing 
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different conflict scenarios at 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The autonomous taxiing concept 
was evaluated with respect to 
safety, efficiency and acceptability, 
based on the objective and 
subjective experiment data. 
The overall conclusion was that the 
flight crews were able to operate 
autonomously at the airport surface. 
No incidents occurred. In all cases 
the flight crew was able to detect 
potential conflicts in time and 
conduct a safe resolution, without 
this being accompanied by a 
significant increase in workload. 
The taxi displays with traffic 
information and conflict alerting 
increased the safety by providing 
more Situational Awareness. 
Nonetheless, a considerable number 
of undesirable situations occurred, 
which had a negative effect on the 
efficiency of the operations and thus 
hampered potential capacity 
improvement. These situations were 
mainly due to the uncertain 
intentions of other aircraft. 
The pilots considered ATC to be 
essential, especially during LVC. 
 
Applicability 
The current study focussed on 
conflict detection and resolution 
during autonomous taxiing. The 
concept of autonomous taxiing is 
however impacted by many more 
aspects, like routing, the timing of 
operations, sequencing of the 
aircraft, runway crossing, etc. These 
aspects need further study. 
The current experiment was set up 
as generic where the concept 
definition and design of cockpit 
support are concerned. Airport 
layout however has impact on 
possible routes, conflict situations 
and resolutions possible and thus 
influences the scenarios that can be 
conducted. Experiment trails on 
more and less complex airports than 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol may 
give more insight in the effect of 
airport layout on the feasibility of 
the concept. 
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Summary 
The growth in air transport creates the need for weather independent airport operations. 
Currently, Low Visibility Conditions have a strong negative effect on the airport capacity. One 
of the reasons is the reduced capacity of Air Traffic Control. Due to the limited outside view of 
Ground Controllers from the control tower, additional workload is generated, which limits the 
number of taxiing aircraft a controller can control. Transferring some of the tasks of the 
controller to the flight crew is therefore seen as a potential means to increase capacity. 
Enhanced taxi display systems in the cockpit may enable this. In the ultimate case, the flight 
crew can operate independent of Air Traffic Control; hence autonomous taxiing. This paper 
discusses the potential of autonomous taxiing with a focus on taxi separation. An experiment 
was conducted with different taxi display systems and Alert Levels to evaluate the concept with 
respect to safety, efficiency and acceptability. The results indicate that improved taxi displays 
increase the safety by providing more Situational Awareness and may enable taxiing without 
Air Traffic Control support. A considerable number of inefficient situations occurred though, 
mainly due to the uncertainty about intentions of other aircraft. Furthermore navigation errors 
occurred that may be prevented by route deviation alerting. Both indicate areas for 
improvement.
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Nomenclature 
tCPA = time to closest point of approach, s 
p =  significance, - 
r =  effect size, - 
µ =  mean 
σ =  standard deviation 
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Abbreviations 
 
AAS Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AL Alert Level 
AMM Airport Moving Map 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
ATSA-SURF Enhanced Traffic Awareness on the Airport Surface 
CD&R Conflict Detection & Resolution 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CPA Closest Point of Approach 
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication 
DCDU Data link Control and Display Unit 
EFB Electronic Flight Bag 
GC Ground Controller 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
LVC Low Visibility Conditions 
ND Navigation Display 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory 
NOTAM Notice To Airmen 
PF Pilot Flying 
PFD Primary Flight Display 
PNF Pilot non-Flying 
PZ Protected Zone 
R/T Radio Telephony 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
SA Situational Awareness 
TMX Traffic Manager 
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I. Introduction 
Low Visibility Conditions (LVC) have a large negative effect on the ground control capacity at 
airports and are a cause for delays. LVC apply when the meteorological conditions are such that 
all or part of the manoeuvring area cannot be observed from the control tower. Low Visibility 
Procedures (LVP) have to be conducted [1] which drastically reduces capacity, as illustrated by 
Figure 1 for Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS) [2]. During LVC the Ground Controller (GC) 
is unable to monitor and control ground traffic on the basis of visual surveillance from the 
control tower. Additional support systems (like Surface Movement Radar or multilateration) 
and a more active control of traffic (more position reports between pilot and GC) are used to 
compensate for this. Both of these measures have a negative impact on the GCs workload and 
limit the number of aircraft a GC can control at a time. This is one of the reasons for decreased 
airport capacity during LVC. 
In line with the above, a means to improve airport capacity during LVC is sought by 
transferring some of the GC tasks to the flight crew. Enhanced taxi display systems in the 
cockpit are expected to enable this and allow the flight crew to operate more and ultimately 
fully independent of Air Traffic Control (ATC). Additionally, the flight crew only having to 
monitor and control the ownship might result in more efficient operation. 
This paper discusses the potential of such a fully autonomous (no ATC) taxi solution, with a 
focus on taxi separation, based on a human-in-the-loop flight simulator experiment. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Impact of poor visibility on the capacity of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 
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II. Background 
The desire to have a safer and weather independent airport throughput has led to the 
development of new technologies, incorporated in an overall Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) [3]. A-SMGCS supports controllers, pilots, and 
vehicle drivers in their surveillance, control, routing, and guidance tasks at the airport [4]. 
The Airport Moving Map (AMM) is introduced in the cockpit, as part of A-SMGCS. It provides 
a depiction of the position and orientation of the ownship on a digital airport map, containing all 
the relevant airport elements (Figure 2). Previous research has shown that such a map increases 
the pilot’s Situational Awareness (SA) during taxiing [5,6] whereas the workload decreases 
[5,6,7]. Increased efficiency is obtained by means of increased taxi speeds [7] and fewer 
navigation errors, without a significant increase in head-down time [8]. Further improvement is 
obtained by addition of a taxi route presentation on the AMM [9,10]. 
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) is 
another new technology that effects ground operations. It 
uses short alphanumeric messages instead of Radio 
Telephony (R/T). Pilots argue that CPDLC leads to a 
workload reduction. Drawbacks however are an increase 
of response times and the missing ‘party line’ 
information that provides additional SA [11]. 
Nonetheless, data link messages are seen as the future 
means to provide all non-time critical clearances during 
ground operations. CPDLC also offers the ability to send 
graphical route information that can be used to visualize 
taxi instructions on the AMM.  
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) supports other surveillance 
applications, like Enhanced Traffic Awareness on the Airport Surface (ATSA-SURF) [12]. 
With use of ADS-B aircraft automatically transmit and/or receive data such as identification and 
position. ATSA-SURF combines this information with an AMM and presents it by a Cockpit 
Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) to provide enhanced SA of all traffic. 
These new technologies have been designed to increase the safety, efficiency and capacity of 
airport operations. They also allow flight crews to operate less dependent of ATC, by reducing 
the necessity to repeatedly request route and traffic information. 
 
Figure 2 AMM example 
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III. Concept 
The autonomous taxi study evaluates a concept in which the flight crew is provided with all 
necessary information to safely taxi to a designated point without support from ATC. 
A Autonomous taxi definition 
Full autonomy implies that the flight crew has full responsibility for their taxi manoeuvres and 
separation. ATC provides a destination ‘clearance’ to the runway or gate for the departing or 
arriving aircraft respectively, via R/T or datalink. The flight crew is responsible for arriving at 
this destination in a safe and efficient manner. Time constraints and sequencing are not 
considered in the current study. 
B Flight crew tasks and support needs 
In the autonomous taxiing concept, the current day ATC tasks of guidance, monitoring and 
alerting become flight crew tasks. The task of the Pilot Non-Flying (PNF) to communicate with 
ATC ceases to exist. Instead, the PNF can be more actively involved in navigation and 
surveillance and assist the Pilot Flying (PF). 
Additional support information is essential to compensate for the missing ATC and the limited 
outside view (LVC). Both global and local position awareness are important for navigation and 
guidance of the aircraft, [6,7], and the AMM is a proven means to increase this position 
awareness. The taxi route must be determined in time, so that the aircraft can be controlled 
along this route, without unnecessary braking or stopping. This requires an onboard navigation 
system that contains a planning function; manual planning would be time-consuming and 
inefficient. From the aircraft’s position and destination combined with an airport database, the 
most optimal taxi route can be derived. This requires an up-to-date database and digital Notice 
To Airmen (NOTAM) information. The route can graphically be provided to the flight crew on 
the AMM. 
During taxiing, conflicts with other traffic may arise. In order to detect these conflicts, the flight 
crew must have sufficient SA with respect to the surrounding traffic. Three types of conflicts 
can be distinguished: crossing, in-trail and head-on (Figure 3). Head-on conflicts cannot be 
solved and should be avoided by taking into account one-way rules in the route planning. 
Detecting other aircraft based on visual observation requires 400m RVR [3]. Taxiing under 
worse conditions therefore necessitates additional support. CDTI could provide the required 
information to monitor other traffic. For conflict alerting additional system functionality would 
be required to inform the flight crew of the identity (and severity) of the conflict. 
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To resolve conflicts during taxiing, the heading can only be changed if the airport infrastructure 
allows this. Therefore, in general one of the aircraft has to adjust speed to give way to the other. 
Hence the minimum information required to solve a conflict is to know who has right of way. 
An external source could be used to provide this information, or else commonly known traffic 
rules are required. 
As a final requirement, the implementation of the full autonomous taxi concept as described 
demands that all aircraft are is fitted with ADS-B surveillance technology in order to have a 
complete picture of the surrounding traffic. 
 
Figure 3 Illustration of different conflict situations 
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IV. Experiment design 
The support requirements are collected in a taxi display system, used as the basic support means 
in the initial concept evaluation. The evaluation aims to study the influence of autonomy (ATC 
or flight crew) and different levels of taxi display support. For the sake of practicality, these 
variables have been combined in three ‘autonomy levels’ as defined below and summarised in 
Table 1. 
A. Autonomy level 0 
Autonomy level 0 is the baseline situation, comparable to current day operations where ATC is 
in control (no autonomy). In this condition a basic taxi display is used, presented on the 
Navigation Display (ND). It consists of an AMM and a depiction of the taxi route clearance as 
provided by ATC. The AMM presents the airport elements as derived from an Aerodrome 
Mapping Database [13] required to provide guidance to the flight crew [14]. These elements are 
positioned with respect to the ownship and scaled according to the ND settings. The taxi route is 
uplinked via a CPDLC and consists of an alphanumeric and graphical part. The alphanumeric 
message is shown on the Data link Control and Display Unit (DCDU). The graphical message 
contains a list of waypoints representing the taxi route from the ownship position to the 
destination, which is used to display the route as a green line on the AMM as illustrated by 
Figure 4. Other communication with ATC is done via R/T. 
 
B Autonomy level 1 
In the condition of autonomy level 1, the flight crew is responsible for Conflict Detection & 
Resolution (CD&R) and there is no ATC support other than the provision of the destination 
‘clearance’ via datalink. The taxi display is that of autonomy level 0, enhanced by CDTI. Other 
aircraft are presented by white aircraft symbols with identification and ground speed indication; 
see Figure 6a). 
 
Figure 4 Representation of the taxi clearance, illustrating the  
part of the taxi clearance depicted on the taxi display 
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C Autonomy level 2 
Autonomy level 2 builds on autonomy level 1 with additional conflict alerting functionality. 
The flight crew is alerted when other aircraft are at close range or conflicts are predicted in the 
near future, based on a basic Closest Point of Approach (CPA) algorithm [15]. The CPA 
algorithm uses Protected Zones (PZ) around all aircraft, based on their size plus a safety margin 
of 6.25 [m]. The values are empirically determined and may need to be adjusted through a 
sensitivity study. A predicted separation loss of two PZs is defined as a conflict. To detect 
conflicts, the CPA is determined for each aircraft pair using their state-vectors, as illustrated in 
Figure 5. If the predicted PZs overlap at the CPA, the time to CPA, tCPA, determines the 
severity of the conflict. Three alert levels (AL) have been defined, see Table 2. AL 0 is used to 
indicate that there are no conflicts (tCPA ≥60). 
 
 
 
1. Alert level 1 
AL 1 requires crew awareness and may require crew action. A range criterion of 150m is used 
to provide SA for nearby aircraft that are no direct threat and alerts are given for predicted 
conflicts within 60 seconds. The concerned aircraft are coloured yellow on the CDTI. 
 
2. Alert level 2 
AL 2 requires immediate crew awareness and may require compensatory action by the flight 
crew. Alerts are given for predicted conflicts within 30 seconds. The intruding aircraft are 
coloured amber on the CDTI and an aural attention getting sound (‘beep’) is provided. 
 
3. Alert level 3 
AL 3 requires immediate compensatory action by the flight crew. Alerts are given for predicted 
conflicts within 10 seconds. The intruding aircraft are coloured red on the CDTI and a red 
coloured message ‘TRAFFIC’ is shown on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) together with a 
‘TRAFFIC’ callout, see Figure 6b. 
 
Figure 5 Schematic illustration of the state-based CPA conflict detection 
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Table 2 Alert Level criteria. 
 Alert requirement Symbol color Aural alert 
AL 0 -  white - 
AL 1 
tCPA < 60 sec or 
separation < 150 m 
yellow - 
AL 2 tCPA < 30 sec amber ‘beep’ 
AL 3 tCPA < 10 sec red TRAFFIC 
 
Table 1 Overview of the autonomy levels applied 
Autonomy condition CD&R by HMI support 
Autonomy level 0 ATC AMM 
Autonomy level 1 Flight Crew AMM + CDTI 
Autonomy level 2 Flight Crew 
AMM + CDTI  
+ conflict alerting 
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(a) Autonomy level 1 with the AMM, taxi route and CDTI. 
 
 
(b) Autonomy level 2 with the additional alerting functions showing  
     conflicts of AL 1 and AL 3. 
Figure 6 Taxi display presented on the ND for autonomy levels 1 and 2 
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V. Experimental evaluation 
A Goal of the experiment 
The main goal of the experiment was to determine whether flight crews were able to taxi the 
aircraft and solve conflicts under autonomous conditions. 
B. Subjects 
Five crews of two professional male airline pilots participated in the experiment. Their ages 
ranged from 30 to 56 years (µ = 43.3, σ = 9.3) and they had an average experience of 6,755 
flight hours. Two subjects had (experimental) experience with taxi displays, five with datalink 
technology and four had used digital maps on an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) before. 
C. Independent variables 
Two independent variables were used: the three autonomy levels as previously described and 
the following two visibility conditions, see Table 3: 
 400m RVR: flight crews should be able to perform CD&R by visual reference [3]; and 
 150m RVR: flight crews cannot perform CD&R but should be able to taxi based on the 
outside view. 
D. Simulator setup 
The National Aerospace Laboratory’s (NLR) 6 DOF civil flight simulator GRACE (Figure 7) 
was used to conduct the experiment. The hardware and software of GRACE are configurable for 
research purposes and a Boeing B747 cockpit layout was used. Two EFB displays functioning 
as DCDUs were installed at both sides of the cockpit. Traffic was simulated by NLR’s Traffic 
Manager (TMX). 
 
 
Figure 7 GRACE simulator at NLR 
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E. Procedures 
Each flight crew participated in the experiment for one day, consisting of the following 
sessions: briefing, pre-experiment questionnaire, four simulator sessions of which the first 
served as a training session each containing after-run questionnaires, after-experiment 
questionnaire and a debriefing session. Each simulator session contained four scenarios, during 
which the role of PF and PNF was switched. The twelve experiment scenarios were performed 
in random order and the independent variables were varied as shown in Table 3. 
 
F. Scenarios 
Each scenario consisted of an inbound or 
outbound taxi-run of approximately ten minutes at 
AAS. Before the start of the run the taxi route was 
uplinked and presented on both the DCDU 
(Figure 8) and the taxi display (Figure 6). 
 
Background traffic was present in all scenarios to 
increase the level of realism. In addition, each 
scenario contained intruding aircraft, to create a 
number of conflict events during the run. Conflicts varied (location and intruder), to avoid 
predictability. Three groups of comparable events that assumingly would require the same 
amount of workload were used: crossing traffic from the right, crossing traffic from the left, and 
traffic in front of the ownship slowing down. 
Table 3 Experiment matrix 
Cond. Pilot flying Autonomy level Visibility condition 
1 Captain 0 400m RVR 
2 First Officer 0 400m RVR 
3 Captain 1 400m RVR 
4 First Officer 1 400m RVR 
5 Captain 2 400m RVR 
6 First Officer 2 400m RVR 
7 Captain 0 150m RVR 
8 First Officer 0 150m RVR 
9 Captain 1 150m RVR 
10 First Officer 1 150m RVR 
11 Captain 2 150m RVR 
12 First Officer 2 150m RVR 
 
Figure 8 DCDU interface 
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After each run, subjects completed an after-run questionnaire, consisting of workload, SA, 
safety, and efficiency ratings. Workload was measured with the NASA-TLX scale [16] and SA 
with the Situational Awareness Rating Technique (SART) [17,18]. 
Subjects were instructed to complete each run by adhering to the taxi route provided and to 
control the aircraft like they would do in reality. The Rules of the Air [19] applied with respect 
to the right-of-way. 
G. Measurements 
Objective data collected consisted of the ownship performance data (aircraft parameters, display 
settings) and conflict data (ALs). Eye tracking software FaceLAB [20] was used to record the 
subject’s point of gaze. Subjective data were collected by questionnaires. 
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VI. Results and discussion 
The experiment held was the first study of the autonomous taxi concept, evaluating the safety, 
efficiency and acceptability with respect to CD&R. 
A. Safety 
1. Navigation errors 
Navigation errors are defined as deviations from the assigned taxi route. In two runs (3,3%) a 
navigation error occurred, both during 150m RVR and autonomy level 1. One crew missed an 
assigned turn and taxied onto a wrong taxiway and another crew deviated from the centerline 
and ended up on the taxiway shoulders. Both mistakes were immediately identified and 
corrected. 
The AMM was expected to contribute largely to the navigation performance of the flight crew 
[8], yet two serious errors occurred. Analysis indicated that the first mistake was due to 
miscommunication (the PNF provided wrong instructions to the PF). The second mistake 
occurred because both pilots were distracted by a conflict of two nearby aircraft on the AMM. 
This indicates that traffic situations concerning other aircraft may be distracting and possibly 
only a selection of relevant traffic should be presented to prevent this. Additionally route 
deviation alerting could be applied to warn the crew in time of the deviation. 
 
2. Conflict anticipation 
During the autonomy level 0 scenarios, conflict anticipation depended on ATC instructions. 
Therefore only conflict anticipation during the autonomy levels 1 and 2 can be considered, 
which implies that basically the impact of conflict alerting is examined. Out of 50 planned 
conflicts where the ownship had to give way, 43 actually occurred and were analysed in more 
detail with respect to reaction time, alert level and separation. Pilot response to determine 
reaction time was defined as a clear adjustment of the aircraft’s ground speed by a decrease of 
thrust or use of the brake pedals. 
Reaction time was measured referenced to the conflict start, therefore a negative reaction time 
implies anticipation before situation was defined as a conflict. Average reaction times were 
lower for scenarios with alerting, but no significant difference was found. Reaction time may 
however not be a good indication of conflict anticipation. The conflict start is determined using 
the state-vector and does not take the distance to the conflict (CPA) into account. Yet, this 
distance may be an important trigger for pilot reaction. Furthermore, the instance of reaction 
says nothing about the instance of detection. The conflict can mentally be solved before a 
response is given. In spite of this, Figure 9 shows that alerting contributes considerably to the 
reaction time. The number of responses is higher immediately after the alert is given when 
comparing autonomy level 2 with 1. This is a logical result, as subjects directly react to the 
alert. When the subjects know that alerting is enabled, this may also cause them to wait for an 
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alert before they take action. The automation (alerting) influences the behaviour of the flight 
crew [21].  
 
 
The Alert level (AL) is derived from the remaining time to the conflict at the instance of 
reaction and indicates the severity of the conflict. Comparing the ALs at the moment of reaction 
does not give significant results, mainly due to the small dataset. Nevertheless as shown in 
Table 4, a difference between the autonomy levels exists. AL 3 never occurred during autonomy 
level 2. That AL 3 did occur during the autonomy level 1 condition may be caused by the pilots 
not experiencing the AL 3 situation as a direct threat. This could imply that the alerts were 
given too early. Of the subjects, 8 out of 10 however agreed to the alert timings being 
satisfactory and one found them too late. 
 
 
Separation distances at the instance of reaction are compared as a third indicator of the response 
of the pilot to the conflict severity. Figure 10 shows box plots of these separation distances for 
both independent variables. It shows that the separation distances were larger for autonomy 
Table 4 Alert level at reaction * Autonomy level Crosstabulation 
 Autonomy level 1 Autonomy level 2 Total 
Alert level 0 2 (10.0%) 3 (13.0%) 5 (11.6%) 
Alert level 1 6 (30.0%) 10 (43.5%) 16 (37.2%) 
Alert level 2 8 (40.0%) 10 (43.5%) 18 (41.9%) 
Alert level 3 4 (20.0%) 0 (0%) 4 (9.3%) 
Total 20 (100.0%) 23 (100.0%) 43 (100.0%) 
 
Figure 9 Reaction times frequency distributions. 
Reaction time = 0 when alerts are given during  autonomy level 2 
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level 2 when compared to 1. This effect is largest for the 150m RVR condition. A Mann-
Whitney test [22] confirms that the separation distance was significantly larger during 
autonomy level 2 (U = 116.00, p < 0.01, r = -0.42). For the 150m RVR visibility conditions the 
difference is highly significant (U = 26.50, p < 0.001, r = -0.62), while no significant difference 
is found for the 400m RVR condition (U = 25.00, ns, r = -0.09). The findings show that alerting 
indeed signals the pilot to take action. This causes lower alert levels to occur and larger 
separation distances to be kept. Overall, this results in safer situations for autonomy level 2. 
 
3. Situational Awareness 
SA was measured after each run with the SART-10D self-rating technique [17]. 115 Of the 120 
SA questionnaires completed were valid. The average scores are presented in Figure 11. 
Factorial Analysis of Variance [22] (ANOVA) shows that the autonomy level has a significant 
main effect on the SA (F(2,109) = 3.75, p < 0.05, ω2 = 0.04). Post hoc tests revealed that the 
amount of SA is significantly higher for autonomy level 2 (p < 0.05) in comparison with 
autonomy level 0. Between other autonomy levels no significant differences were found. The 
SA scores were higher for the better visibility conditions, but this was a non-significant effect. 
 
 
Also no interaction effect between autonomy and visibility was found. This means that the 
visibility condition does not influence the amount of SA for the different autonomy levels. 
The increase of SA by autonomy level can be explained by the increased support. The 400m 
RVR condition should allow for CD&R using the outside vision, this did however not 
contribute to a significantly higher SA. Subjects found the additional support provided on the 
taxi display very clear. The CDTI created a visual picture of the surrounding traffic, said to add 
 
Figure 10 Separation distances for the different experiment conditions 
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to the SA. The missing ATC support however was said to decrease the SA during autonomy 
levels 1 and 2, due to the lack of R/T background information and consequently the missing 
information on other aircraft’s intent. 
 
4. Head-down time 
Head-down time was analysed using the tracked pilot gaze. Due to subjects looking outside the 
range of the eye trackers and system inaccuracies however, the data was incomplete and 46 data 
sets were excluded from the analysis. These invalid data sets were mostly subject dependent. 
The head-down time is expressed as a percentage of the total recorded pilot gaze time, as 
presented in Figure 12a. For the higher autonomy levels the amount of head-down time 
increases, which is confirmed as a significant main effect by a factorial ANOVA (F(2,68) = 
8.24, p < 0.01, ω2 = 0.09). Post hoc test show a significant increase for both autonomy level 1 
(p<0.05) and autonomy level 2 (p<0.01) with respect to autonomy level 0. For the visibility 
condition no main effect or interaction effect with the autonomy level was found. The findings 
indicate that the flight crew looks more inside the cockpit for CD&R during autonomy levels 1 
and 2 and suggests more intensive use of the taxi display in those situations. No significant 
difference was found between both autonomous conditions. It was expected that the alerting 
function would reduce the need for constant monitoring of the taxi display but an increase of 
head-down time for autonomy level 2 is observed instead. This might be caused by the alerting 
triggering both pilots to look inside. 
The head-down time of the PF and PNF is presented in Figure 12b. During autonomy level 0 
both pilots look at the displays for a similar amount of time. During autonomy level 1 and 2 the 
head-down time of the PNF is much higher. This indicates a division of tasks, which was 
confirmed by the subjects. The PF focusses on controlling the aircraft, while the PNF monitors 
surrounding traffic and provides support. 
 
Figure 11 SART-10D average scores for the different experiment conditions 
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5. Subjective safety 
After each run the subjects assessed the level of safety experienced on an ordinal scale from 
1(very low) to 6 (very high). The results are shown in Figure 13, and indicate that the majority 
of runs were considered safe. The autonomy level 2 runs overall were rated safer than levels 0 
and 1, and the better visibility condition was experienced as safer. 
 
(a) With respect to visibility condition. 
 
 
(b) With respect to the role of the pilot. 
Figure 12 Head down time error plots for the different autonomy levels 
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During the autonomy level 0 most subjects noticed that safety completely depended on ATC. In 
particular during 150m RVR situations, ATC was the only source of traffic information. During 
the autonomous conditions the biggest issue was the missing intention information of other 
aircraft. This created a need to contact ATC, which was not possible. Overall the poor visibility 
was considered the biggest safety issue. Based on the subject’s comments the differences in 
safety scores can be attributed to run-dependent situations rather than the independent variables. 
B. Efficiency 
1. Taxi speed 
The average groundspeeds during taxiing are presented in Figure 14. They show opposite trends 
for both visibility conditions; taxi speeds increase at 400m RVR and decrease at 150m RVR. A 
factorial ANOVA confirms the visibility condition to be a significant main effect (F(1,54) = 
23.616, p < 0.001, ω2 = 0.15) but not the autonomy level. A significant interaction effect is 
found (F(2,68) = 6.059, p < 0.05, ω2 = 0.037), which confirms that the visibility conditions of 
400m RVR and 150m RVR are affected differently by the autonomy level. 
The results found are however not confirmed when the taxi speeds are considered per crew. The 
limited amount of data however does not allow a detailed analysis. Furthermore, it is likely that 
scenario dependent events, like the amount of stops, have had a major impact on the taxi speeds. 
Therefore the validity of the trends found can not be confirmed. 
 
Figure 13 Subjective safety scores 
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2. Unforced stops 
Unforced stops are examined as clearly inefficient situations. During taxiing, most power is 
needed to get the aircraft rolling; hence unnecessary stops are expensive events. When required, 
the efficient solution would be to anticipate by timely reducing speed.  
Again the 43 conflict situations where the ownship had to give way were analysed. In 22 of 
these cases the ownship stopped and in 21 a speed reduction led to conflict resolution. Only a 
small difference in stopping v. not stopping for both autonomy conditions is found, see Figure 
15a. This may be caused by the alerting functionality informing the flight crew at an earlier 
stage. During 150m RVR the majority of conflict situations led to a stop while at 400m RVR 
most conflicts were solved by speed reduction, see Figure 15b. This may be caused by the flight 
crew’s inability to perform CD&R based on the outside view at 150m RVR. 
When the ownship has right of way in a conflict, speed reduction or stopping should not be 
necessary. Yet, out of 25 right of way conflicts in 10 cases speed was reduced, leading to a full 
stop in 4 cases. As observed during the experiment and commented by all subjects, this was 
caused by the unclear intentions of other aircraft resulting in (overly) cautious behaviour to 
ensure safety. Despite of the order of priority being clear, 8 of the 10 subjects would like to 
have additional information on other aircraft’s intention and route. This information could be 
provided, e.g.by visual cues on the taxi display, to further improve the efficiency of the concept. 
 
 
Figure 14 Taxi speeds for the for the different experiment conditions 
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3. Subjective efficiency 
The subjects rated the efficiency on an ordinal scale from 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), as 
presented in Figure 16. Most runs were rated efficient, and differences between the various 
conditions are very small. Subjects commented that the taxi display contributed positively to the 
efficiency whereas the lack of ATC was said to be a negative factor. 
 
 
(a) Stops vs. autonomy level 
 
. 
(b) Stops vs. visibility condition 
Figure 15 Number of stops for situations where the ownship had to give right of way
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C. Acceptability 
1. Workload 
The NASA-TLX workload scores showed that “Mental Demand” and “Effort” were the largest 
contributors to the workload experienced. Figure 17 presents the total workload for all different 
conditions, using normalized (µ = 0, σ = 1) scores to discard inter-subject variability. It shows 
that for 150m RVR the measured workload is about the same while for 400m RVR the 
workload for autonomy levels 1 and 2 in particular seems lower. Visibility is confirmed to be a 
significant main effect by a factorial ANOVA (F(1,114) = 7.483, p < 0.01, ω2 = 0.053). Taxiing 
under low visibility is known to be a highly demanding task [9,10] and the results confirm that 
worsening visibility creates a higher workload. The impact of the visibility condition suppresses 
that of the autonomy. The decreasing workload for autonomy levels 1 and 2 at 400m RVR is 
found to be not significant. 
 
2. Subjective acceptability 
The subjects rated the acceptability on a scale from 1 (very unacceptable) to 6 (very acceptable), 
as shown in Figure 18. Overall, the 400m RVR condition was rated as more acceptable. Further 
reduction of visibility seems to make taxiing less acceptable. The scores for autonomy levels 0 
and 2 are a bit higher than those for level 1. Subject’s indicated that this was due to lack of 
safety (15% of the cases) and workload increase (12,5%) during autonomy level 1. Apparently, 
based on the higher scores for autonomy level 2, this is to some extent counterbalanced by the 
alerting functionality. The subjects who rated autonomy level 2 as unacceptable indicated safety 
(12,5%) and to a lesser extent workload (5%) to contribute to the unacceptability. Subjects 
regard ATC to be a crucial element during LVC. Its unavailability makes autonomy levels 1 and 
2 less acceptable. 
Figure 16 Subjective efficiency scores 
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Figure 17 Normalized NASA-TLX scores 
Figure 18 Subjective acceptability scores
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VII. Conclusions and recommendations 
The current study evaluated the full autonomous taxiing concept as a means to increase airport 
capacity during LVC. An experiment was conducted to evaluate the abilities of flight crews to 
taxi and perform CD&R. First results show that it is possible for flight crews to operate at the 
airport surface autonomously. The subjects were in all cases able to timely monitor and resolve 
potential conflicts without this being accompanied by a significant workload increase. The 
alerting function clearly had a positive influence on conflict anticipation. 
The results are less satisfying when efficiency is considered. Therefore, the concept in its 
current application is not expected to improve airport ground capacity. The lack of information 
on other aircraft’s intent is the main cause of this inefficiency (unnecessary speed reduction and 
stops). From the subject’s point of view, ATC is essential, particularly during LVC. There was a 
high demand for ATC support and the lack of it made the autonomous taxi concept less safe and 
difficult to accept. The demand for ATC may however to some extent be replaced by provision 
of intent information as well. 
The taxi display was seen as helpful support, improving navigation and SA and as such 
improving safety. Each level of the taxi display as evaluated was experienced as useful. 
Further research of the full autonomous taxi concept should focus on the provision of intent 
information, which may have a positive effect on efficiency. In addition to CD&R as evaluated 
in the current study, more advanced topics like timing and sequencing need to be addressed. The 
current taxi display system has proven to be a solid basis for further developments. 
Alternatively intermediate concepts of task division between flight crew and ATC could be 
considered, which can help lower controller workload. 
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